


# NGT\_AH3\_03 Primary Protective Device

Engineering Justification Paper

January 2024



## Table of contents

1. Executive Summary .....	3
2. Summary Table .....	4
3. Project Status and Request Summary.....	5
4. Problem/Opportunity Statement .....	7
5. Project Definition .....	12
6. Options Considered.....	21
7. Business Case Outline and Discussion.....	35
8. Preferred Option Scope and Project Plan .....	36
9. Conclusion .....	42
10. Appendices .....	42

# 1. Executive Summary

1. In January 2019 a vibration-related failure at [REDACTED] led to an incident investigation by Health & Safety Executive (HSE) which discovered slamshut valves able to be bypassed at site. A bypass stream allows a direct flow passage from upstream to downstream pipework without passing through the regulating system. This was then highlighted as a potential safety issue by the HSE and deemed unacceptable in terms of National Gas procedural control. Furthermore, section 8.7 of IGEM/TD/13- which was introduced after these assets were built- states that regulator streams shall not be provided with a bypass unless another means of pressure control is incorporated in the system.
2. As a result of these findings by the HSE at [REDACTED], HSE filed an Action Legal against NGT to identify all similar bypassed slamshut valves across the NTS, generate a plan for risk controls and implement them to address the issue. Therefore, it is NGT's obligation to fulfil HSE's Action Legal by 1 May 2024.
3. NGT identified [REDACTED] sites that contain uncontrolled bypasses around slamshuts and categorised them into three different scenarios based on their site configurations. Site surveys of the current gas pipework arrangement were also undertaken by NGT and a third-party contractor at [REDACTED] complex sites to identify the type of modification required to comply with the requirement of the applicable regulations (TD/13)/HSE requirements and evaluate a range of possible mitigation options.
4. Solutions at all sites in scope apart from the [REDACTED] complex sites have been delivered. NGT has ongoing dialogue with HSE and as part of the current project status, HSE has closed the original Action Legal and issued a new Action Legal to address the issues at the remaining [REDACTED] sites.
5. The total indicative project value for resolving this legacy issue at all [REDACTED] sites is currently forecast at £3.302m, Ofgem is requested to assess the need case, our preferred option and associated funding request.

## 2. Summary Table

Name of Project	Primary Protection Device Bypass Systems
Scheme reference/ mechanism or category	██████████
Primary Investment Driver	Safety
Output references/type	██████████
Project Initiation Year	2022
Project Close Out Year	2026
Total Installed Cost Estimate (£m)	3.302
Cost Estimated Accuracy (%)	15%
Project Spend to date (£m)	██████████
Price Basis	2018/2019
Current Project Stage Gate	ND500 T5 / F4
Reporting Table	RRP Table 6.2 (Projects) and table 6.1 (CAPEX_Summary)
Outputs included in RIIO T1	No
Outputs included in RIIO T2	No

**Table 1 Project Summary Table**

## 3. Project Status and Request Summary

### Overview

6. National Gas Transmission, hereafter referred to as NGT, are requesting funding to undertake investments to upgrade the primary protection systems on several sites across the NTS. A number of uncontrolled bypasses around protection devices have been identified with the project resolving this issue to bring them to an acceptable level of risk, as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) as per the guidelines of Health and Safety Executive (HSE).
7. In January 2019, a vibration-related failure at [REDACTED] Above Ground Installation (AGI) led to an incident investigation by HSE which discovered bypassed slamshut valves onsite. Two slamshut valves on the pressure reduction streams were identified to have rigid pipework and 1” manual plug valves on them providing a potential route for high pressure gas to bypass the respective slamshut valves. Such bypassing, with no equivalent means to ensure closure of the bypass valves, makes the protective devices (i.e. the slamshut valves) ineffective.
8. Installation of a bypass around slamshut device was a common practice throughout the transmission and distribution networks at the time of these installations, to facilitate balancing of pressure over a closed slamshut to facilitate re-opening it once it has been fired. This design was acceptable before TD/13 was introduced as Communication 1672 in 2001.
9. As a result of these findings, the HSE filed an Action Legal against National Gas Transmission to identify all similar bypassed slamshut valves across the National Transmission System (NTS), generate a plan for risk controls and implement them to address the issue by 1 May 2024<sup>1</sup>. A copy of the Action Legal can be found in Appendix 1.
10. From September 2019 to March 2020, NGT carried out an initial desktop assessment of bypass routes around primary protection device (PPD) on the NTS and identified [REDACTED] slamshut valves with uncontrolled bypasses across [REDACTED] sites. In accordance with the Action Legal, action is required to address the risk to reduce it to ALARP levels.
11. Site surveys have been undertaken to evaluate mitigation options, including assessing the suitability of operational solutions in addition to asset investments. This report provides a detailed view of the project, its associated timings, different options considered and the final preferred options to fulfil HSE’s Action Legal.

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<sup>1</sup> HSE originally filed an Action Legal against NGT to identify all similar bypassed slamshut valves across the NTS, generate a plan for risk controls and implement them to address the issue by 31 December 2023. In January 2024, HSE closed this Action Legal following work completion at [REDACTED] sites in scope and filed another Action Legal for completion of bypass removal at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] and a time bound plan for completion of the works at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

12. Solutions at all sites in scope apart from [REDACTED] have been delivered. NGT has ongoing dialogue with HSE and as part of the current project status, HSE has closed the original Action Legal and issued a new Action Legal to address the issues at the [REDACTED] aforementioned sites.

## Project Status

13. To meet the agreed timescales with the HSE, the project has progressed at funding risk. For all sites apart from [REDACTED], the project is currently at F2 stage (March 2023), and is due for F4 sanction in February 2024 to facilitate the completion of site investment. Commissioning of systems is happening in a phased manner with the final site scheduled to be completed in May 2024.

14. Optioneering and detailed design is ongoing at [REDACTED]. Due to complexity of the site configurations and project scopes, works at [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have a forecast completion date of end of T2. NGT is currently engaging with HSE regarding a time bound plan for completion.

## Request Summary

15. Total project costs for this request is £3.302m (18/19 price base). This comprises [REDACTED] (18/19 price base) spent at risk and [REDACTED] (18/19 price base) estimates for works yet to be completed.

16. The investment within this EJP relates to assets captured within the Plant & Equipment Asset Health Investment Theme. As documented through our Plant & Equipment EJP funding was awarded through our RIIO-2 determination for three years of RIIO-2. Our Plant & Equipment EJP has also documented the additional funding required to remediate additional sites surveyed, and therefore there was no opportunity to risk trade funding from other UIDs to fund the work detailed within this paper, requiring the submission of this additional funding request.

17. Ofgem are invited to assess and approve our preferred options presented within this EJP in line with Special Condition 3.14, which we are requesting an adjustment to the value of the NARMAHOT term.

## 4. Problem/Opportunity Statement

### Why are we doing the work and what happens if we do nothing?

18. In January 2019 a vibration-related failure at █████ AGI led to an incident investigation by HSE, discovering bypassed slamshut valves onsite. A bypass stream allows a direct flow passage from upstream to downstream pipework without passing through the regulating system. This was then highlighted as a potential safety issue by the HSE and deemed unacceptable in terms of National Gas procedural control. Furthermore, section 8.7 of IGEM/TD/13 states that regulator streams shall not be provided with a bypass unless another means of pressure control is incorporated in the system.
19. Installation of a bypass around slamshut device was a common practice throughout the transmission and distribution networks at the time of these installations, to facilitate balancing of pressure over a closed slamshut to facilitate re-opening it once it has been fired. This design was acceptable before TD/13 was introduced as Communication 1672 in 2001.
20. As a result of these findings by the HSE at █████, HSE filed an Action Legal against NGT to identify all similar bypassed slamshut valves across the NTS, generate a plan for risk controls and implement them to address the issue. Therefore, it is NGT's obligation to fulfil HSE's Action Legal by 1 May 2024.
21. A list of protective device with bypass was collected from NGT's asset data repository and verified. Further creep relief calculations were undertaken on those assets. Through these exercises, NGT identified █████ slamshut valves with uncontrolled bypasses across █████ sites. It has been determined that the slam-shut valves on those pressure reduction streams have rigid pipework and manual plug valves that may allow high-pressure gas to bypass the valves, rendering the protective devices ineffective. This poses a significant risk to the system and NGT, and action is required to address it.
22. To mitigate this risk and bring it to an acceptable level of risk, As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) as per the guidelines of Health and Safety Executive (HSE), assessment of the controls to the primary protection systems could be adopted has been undertaken, considering the existing assets on site, operational controls and the investment of installing additional protective devices. Assessment is undertaken on an asset by asset basis due to the site specific slamshut configurations.
23. If we do nothing, the risk will remain meaning we will not be able to demonstrate our compliance with IGEM standard and HSE's guidelines. This would result in escalation by the HSE in the form of an Improvement Notice, highlighting doing nothing is not a valid option.



## Under what circumstances would the need or option change for this project?

24. Through our optioneering we have considered asset and operational solutions which has helped us determine the correct option on a site by site basis. This holistic approach ensures the preferred option provides the optimum approach to reducing risk to ALARP in the most cost-effective manner.
25. The option papers from sites surveys and options evaluations attached in the Appendix highlight the need for improvement to the primary protection system in all scenarios. In addition, as the driver for this project is an HSE Action Legal, it is highly unlikely that NGT would change the scope of this project.

## What are we going to do with this project?

26. The project involves identifying the locations of the primary protective devices with the aforementioned safety concern in the NTS, conducting initial surveys at those sites to analyse current site pipework arrangements and modifications required to comply with applicable regulations, then undertaking further creep relief calculations and engineering assessments and implementing preferred operation or asset investments on sites.
27. The engineering solutions at all the sites in scope apart from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] have been implemented following conceptual and detailed design against specific requirements. Works at [REDACTED] are scheduled to be delivered by May 2024 and solutions at [REDACTED] are anticipated to be implemented by end of T2 due to complexity of the project and long-lead items.

## What makes this project difficult?

28. The HSE set an original required completion date of 31 December 2023. The need to progress the project at pace has required us to commence the project at funding risk. In the recent engagement with HSE, HSE was satisfied with the solutions implemented at all the sites in scope apart from [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and closed the Action Legal and issued a new Action Legal to address the issues at the remaining [REDACTED] sites.
29. Furthermore, the [REDACTED] identified sites are geographically spread across the country making it more complex to plan and deliver this project across a large geographical region.
30. Additionally, sites have specific asset configurations and designs meaning each site need individual optioneering and design conducted rather than applying a common approach across all of the sites in scope, therefore require bespoke solutions at each site.



31. Further delivery and operational difficulties include availability of the certain contractors that can supply the asset components along with the challenge of long lead items from manufacturers.
32. For [REDACTED], there will be the need for outages to enable solutions to be implemented. Aligning our works to these outages given other priority work on the NTS poses delivery constraints.
33. All of the aforementioned constraints cause delay in delivering the works on sites.

### What are the key milestone dates for project delivery?

34. The project needs to be completed as soon as possible to meet HSE requirements. The project aims to have the solutions installed at all the sites in scope apart from the more complex sites- [REDACTED] - by June 2024. NGT is having ongoing dialogue with HSE to agree on a completion date for the more complexed sites such as [REDACTED] [REDACTED] which is likely to be end of T2.
35. We are currently at stage F4 of the Network Development Process (ND500) - a process aimed at defining and managing the projects lifecycle from inception to closure, ensuring we meet minimum requirement for each project phase.
36. Table 2 provides a summary of the programme including scheduled and completed milestones for all sites in scope except [REDACTED].

ND500 Milestone	Milestone Description	Month
T2		Jan 2023
F2	Feasibility Sanction	March 2023
T3	Agreement to proceed to conceptual design	July 2023
F3	Long Lead Item sanction	November 2023
T4	Scope Freeze	Jan 2024
F4	Detailed Design & Build sanction	Feb 2024
T6	Hand back for closure	May 2024
F5	Closure	June 2024

Table 2 Project Stage Summary for all sites in scope except [REDACTED]

37. Table 3 provides a summary of the programme at [REDACTED].

ND500 Milestone	Milestone Description	Month
T4	Scope Freeze	Apr 2024
F4	Detailed Design & Build sanction	Feb 2025
T6	Hand back for closure	Mar 2026
F5	Closure	Aug 2026

Table 3 Project Stage Summary for [REDACTED]

## How will we understand if the project has been successful?

38. Overall project success will be defined by the installation and acceptance of the bypassed PPD system modifications.
39. The design assessment/detailed design was a fundamental phase of this project to ensure the pressure protection system modifications we are installing meet the SIL2 requirement and address the additional improvements recommended by the HSE.
40. Once commissioning has been completed, the HSE shall be informed to agree closure of the Action Legal.

## Related Projects

41. There are a few related projects at [REDACTED] sites in scope as follows:

### Bacton Over Pressurisation Systems

42. A separate Action Legal imposed by HSE requires over pressurisation systems on incomers at Bacton to have an improved SIL rating. NGT have progressed a project to install additional assets to meet this requirement. This investment is progressing at funding risk and is subject to a separate funding request.

### Flow Control Valve Stream/ Pressure Reduction Stream Replacement

43. [REDACTED] – PRS streams A and B are scheduled to be replaced in 25/26, including removing the FCV. Streams C, D and E in this project's scope are not being intervened upon, therefore, no interaction.

## Project Boundaries

44. The boundary of this project is delivery of investments to mitigate the uncontrolled bypass risk at identified sites. This involves undertaking assessments to understand the current layouts of the bypassed primary protective devices, assessing all possible options to resolve the issue, delivery of the selected options, updating of drawings and records.

## 5. Project Definition

### Assets in Scope

45. The purpose of flow or pressure regulation is to allow control of gas pressure/flow characteristics from the NTS pressure to that required for use by customers, actuation of valves or to provide fuel gas to compressors.
46. Flow Control Valves (FCVs) allow the remote control of the flow of gas and pressure between two or more sections of pipeline. They are sometimes used in conjunction with Pressure Regulators and other devices such as Slamshuts to make up a flow control stream. They may be configured as single streams or be configured with two or more streams in parallel. The stream may contain additional components such as valves, pilot valves, filters and impulse pipework.
47. Pressure reduction streams control the pressure between two different pressure tiers. Their prime purpose is to control and regulate the pressure into the downstream pipeline or pipework. Typically, a Pressure Reduction Installation (PRI) consists of a pair of streams in working / standby configuration. The main components of stream consist of a Slamshut, two Regulators and a relief valve. Additional components include valves, pilot valves, filters and impulse pipework.
48. Pressure Systems Regulations require, in some instances, the use of “Protective Devices”. These devices are designed to protect the pressure system against system failure, and give warning that failure may occur. Some devices are classified as “Primary Protective Devices”, they act as the final or ultimate devices to prevent safe operating limits being exceeded.
49. Downstream over pressurisation must be avoided to protect pipework and equipment from being exposed to pressures for which they are not designed. In extreme cases of over pressurisation, loss of containment can be experienced as a result of, for example, leakage from pipe joints, or rupture of pipework.
50. Slamshuts or relief valves installed on a Pressure/ Flow control streams typically act as Primary Protective devices which automatically operate if the downstream pressure increases above the maximum operating pressure, to protect the downstream pipe work from over pressure failure.
51. Slamshuts are designed to operate at a level that does not exceed the designated 'Safe Operating Limit' (SOL) of the pipework. The SOL is set such that a margin of safety exists between the SOL and the point at which overpressurisation might cause damage. The pressures at which slamshuts are triggered on equipment that makes up the NTS ranges

from approximately 10 mbar up to the full NTS pressure of 94 bar. All slamshuts operating in above 7 bar systems are covered by PSSR legislation.

52. Similarly, a creep relief valve relieves excess pressure by having a lower set-point than the related slamshut to prevent 'nuisance' operation of slamshut. Increases in downstream pressure, for example, caused by slight weeping of gas through a pressure regulator during a period of no flow or rising in downstream surrounding temperature are managed via a creep relief valve.




Figure 1 An annotated photo to show a slamshut with a bypass pipework around it at [REDACTED]

53. When a slamshut operates it closes off the supply to downstream connected systems. This can result in a pressure differential building across the closed slamshut. In order to re-open the slamshut it is necessary to reduce or balance the pressure across the device. It is common to install fixed bypass pipework around a slamshut to facilitate this activity as shown in Figure 1. However this should be avoided if no adequate protection is available. The bypass pipework will have manually operable isolation valves installed that in normal operating conditions are maintained in the closed position. These valves are operated on an as-needs basis to facilitate resetting of a tripped slamshut.

54. Through conducting data gathering of protective devices with bypasses in the network and creep relief calculations, bypassed slamshuts were identified on [REDACTED] sites. They are

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

55. The table below summarises existing slamshuts on these sites.

Site Name	Description	Slamshut Setting (Barg)	Above ground or below ground
<b>Scenario 1- Double-stream flow regulating system with a bypass stream</b>			
[REDACTED]	Slamshut valve Stream 1 93/Stream 2 92	76	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut valve 23/27	76	Below ground
<b>Scenario 2- A bypass around the slamshut valve to a downstream asset such as compressor unit and boiler house</b>			
[REDACTED]	Fuel gas slamshut to Unit D	34	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Fuel gas slamshut to Unit C	34	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshuts on Boiler House Supply Stream A & B	10.1/10.3	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on Power Station Supply	36.1/28.6	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut Stream F SS3	8.9	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut stream D SS1/ Stream E SS2	10.1/9.6	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on heating supply Stream C & D	14.4/11.5	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on heating supply Stream E	13	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on heating supply Stream C & D	10	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on heating supply Stream E	9	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshuts on Power Station Supply	37.6/39	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut valve SS3	9	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshuts to Feeders 2 & 23	79.25	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshuts to Feeders	79.25	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut Valve STM1 27/STM 2 31	75.8/74.8	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshuts on Boiler House Supply Stream 1 & 2	9/9.8	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut Valve SS3 Stream E	6.5	Above ground
[REDACTED]	1st slamshut	4.5 approx	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut valves streams 1 & 2	20/23	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on Streams A & B boiler house supply	9/10	Above ground
[REDACTED]	Slamshut on supply to water bath heater PZV5037	7.5	Above ground

██████████ ██████████	Main fuel gas supply slamshuts PCV5119/PCV5106	35	Above ground
██████████ ██████████	Slamshuts on supply to standby generator PCV5419/PCV5406	10/10.3	Above ground
<b>Scenario 3 A bypass around slamshut incomer valve</b>			
██████████	Incomer Valve	70 approx	Above ground
██████████	Incomer Valve	70 approx	Above ground
██████████	Incomer valves (V11003)	60 approx	Above ground
██████████	Incomer valve (V41001)	77 approx	Above ground
██████████	Incomer Valve (PZV6003/PZV6040)	77 approx	Above ground

Table 4 Assets summary in scope

## Real Life Examples of Problem

56. Amongst the █████ sites, some sites which have similar asset arrangements and existing assets in the systems present the same/ a similar problem, therefore have been grouped together. There is a total of 3 scenarios:

- **Scenario 1-** Double-stream flow regulating system with an uncontrolled bypass stream.
- **Scenario 2-** A bypass around the slamshut valve to a downstream asset such as compressor unit and boiler house.
- **Scenario 3-** A bypass on slamshut incomer valve.

### Scenario 1- Double-stream flow regulating system with an uncontrolled bypass stream

57. At both ████████████████████, there is a double-stream flow and pressure regulating system controlled by a pair of flow control valves (FCVs) and two independently controlled pressure control valves (PCVs) configured in a parallel stream arrangement. Pressure regulating systems are installed to act as boundary control between feeders rated at 85 bar and 70 bar at ██████████, and 84 bar and 70 bar at ██████████.

██████████

58. ██████████ is fed by multiple feeders (██████████) and is equipped with gas compressors for necessary system pressure up-rating. The gas flows through the site is determined by a series of valves remotely operated by GNCC to achieve the required transmission path. There are no operational interlocks built into the Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) valve logic.



59. The gas passes through a double-stream volumetric flow control system for flow and pressure regulation. The flow rate of gas through the system is controlled by a pair of flow control valves (FCV1 – 605597 and FCV2 – 605536) configured in a parallel stream arrangement. Pressure protection is provided by two independently controlled pressure control valves (PCV1 – 605595 and PCV2 - 605594). Further pressure protection is provided by an independent pressure operated slam-shut system which operates the slam-shut valves SS1 (605593) and SS2 (605592).
60. There is a bypass stream on site equipped with an isolation valve 605515 (V15). The isolation valve is normally locked shut and can be opened if necessary to allow a gas path independent of the existing regulator system for gas supply to Glenmavis area. There are stabbings on the [REDACTED] bypass pipeline above ground section, which could be utilised for protection devices in any future development. The bypass route is highlighted in figure 2 below.




Figure 2 Bypass route through [REDACTED]

61. Bypass valve V15 is predominantly used for annual routine valve operations (RVOs). However, it is also used to provide a secondary path to ensure gas meets downstream supply when the primary path is isolated (e.g., it was used during lighting strike in 2015). It is currently isolated and locked closed locally. Remote operation is currently disabled but can be enabled if needed.

62. Volumetric control system allows bi-directional gas flow (and gas-feed from other [REDACTED]). However, backflow is not available currently as some downstream [REDACTED] are out of service.




Figure 3 Bypass valve V15 at [REDACTED]



Figure 4 V15 Surrounding pipework arrangement  
[REDACTED]

63. [REDACTED] is fed by Feeders [REDACTED] and consists of the same double-stream flow regulating system as that present at the [REDACTED]. After passing through the regulator

the gas is then supplied to [REDACTED]. The desired gas transmission path can be selected manually by operating a number of block valves.

64. There is a bypass stream on site equipped with an isolation valve 635716 (V16). The isolation valve is normally locked shut and can be opened if necessary to allow a gas path independent of the existing regulator system for gas supply to downstream areas. The bypass at [REDACTED] is entirely buried, and as such any stabbings that may be required as part of the solution will need excavation, and possible hot tap, to avoid outage. The bypass is highlighted in Figure 5 below.




Figure 5 Bypass route through [REDACTED] (highlighted)

65. [REDACTED] has an intelligent slamshut system on both streams which can be vulnerable to both slamshuts operating at the same time (which is thought to have occurred at [REDACTED] following the lightning strike). This is currently an issue as, anecdotally, the slamshuts operate when there is a power dip, although they can be brought back into service rapidly. Similarly, when working on one stream, the other stream can trip.

## Scenario 2- A bypass around the slamshut valve to a downstream asset such as compressor unit and boiler house

66. Amongst the [redacted] sites in scope, [redacted] sites have uncontrolled bypassed slamshut valves connected to a downstream asset, including fuel gas at the compressor unit, heating supply, power station supply and boiler house supply. They are [redacted]

67. For example, at both [redacted], there is a bypass around the slamshut valve to fuel gas at the compressor unit. Another example is [redacted] where there are slamshuts in the heating supply stream which have bypass lines. Similarly, at [redacted], there are slamshuts on Power Station Supply which have bypass lines whilst at [redacted] and [redacted] there are slamshuts on Boiler House Supply which have bypass lines. Figures 6 and 7 show the bypassed slamshuts to streams A and B at [redacted].



Figure 6 Stream A and B slamshuts (circled) with the bypass lines at [redacted]



Figure 7 Bypass lines (green arrows) for Stream A and B at [redacted]



### Scenario 3- A bypass around slamshut incomer valve

68. At both [REDACTED], a number of incomer valves are found to have uncontrolled bypasses around them, they are slamshuts PZV6040, V21003, V41001, V11003 and PZV600 at [REDACTED] and slamshuts A/1 and S1/1 at [REDACTED].



Figure 8 Example of safety valve with bypass installed [REDACTED]



Figure 9 Example of safety valve without bypass installed [REDACTED]

## 6. Options Considered

### Option Selection Process

69. A range of operation and asset options were considered against a list of evaluation criteria to shortlist the potential options to be considered further.
70. Additionally, due to the complexity of the site layout at [REDACTED], surveys of the current gas pipework arrangement were also undertaken by NGT and a third-party contractor at those sites to identify the type of modification required to comply with the requirement of the applicable regulations (TD/13)/HSE requirements and a range of possible options to address the bypass safety concerns.
71. The evaluation criteria being considered when assessing the options are (in approximate order of higher to lower importance):
- Technical feasibility
  - HSE compliance, Schedule
  - CAPEX
  - OPEX
  - Operational flexibility after modification
  - Project complexity
  - Necessary procedures for carrying out the option
72. A key consideration is compliance to NGT and HSE requirements. The most suitable options should enhance the level of gas safety operationally to satisfy the HSE requirement without impacting the current security of supply.
73. After the high-level assessment based on the evaluation criteria was undertaken, a risk assessment was conducted to assess the selected options qualitatively against various risks based on perspectives of operability, maintenance, network security and other identified categories. The risks/categories are scored for each option based on a simple high (red), medium (amber) and low (green) system. Remedial measures to mitigate the risks were also discussed and presented in the individual site options report attached in the appendix where relevant.
74. The following list of categories for risk assessment were chosen for evaluation:
- **Operational risk:** This is with respect to the reliability of the new equipment, the OPEX necessary, procedures required, etc.
  - **Maintenance flexibility:** The maintenance demand on the solution, as well as for routine maintenance on other aspects of the AGI (e.g., RVOs)
  - **Network supply security:** Does the solution provide security of supply should the existing regulator streams fail?
  - **Construction complexity:** The CAPEX required, and the time and site disturbance necessary to implement the solution

- **Speed of reinstatement:** This is the time needed to reinstate the bypass gas flow, if the option relates to the elimination or temporary isolation of the bypass route

75. Details of option selections at each site can be found in the Option Papers attached in the Appendix.

## **Options for ‘Scenario 1’- Double-stream flow regulating system with an uncontrolled bypass stream**

76. As discussed in section 5, at [REDACTED], both sites have a double-stream flow and pressure regulating system controlled by a pair of FCVs and two independently controlled PCVs configured in a parallel stream arrangement. A bypass around these regulator streams is present, which poses a potential safety concern should an event of over pressurisation arise.

77. To address this bypass concern, the existing bypass arrangements at both sites need to be modified to comply with the requirement of the applicable regulations. 10 common options were considered, they are:

### **Option 1A- ‘Do Nothing’ Keep existing arrangement and de-rate the upstream pipework (where the slamshut valve is located) from 85 bar to 70 bar**

78. Option 1A involves derating the pipework upstream of the slamshut to 70 bar from 85 bar. Whilst this would remove the need for the slamshut it is not feasible because of the impact on network operability and capability.

### **Option 1B- Upgrading the pressure rating of downstream feeder to 85 bar**

79. Option 1B involves upgrading the downstream pipework to match the upstream section. Upgrading the downstream system also has implications on downstream assets that may only be rated to 70 bar and therefore need investment to ensure they operate at 85 bar. This would include NGT assets and 3rd party assets, for example, at Distribution network offtakes. Commercial contracts with customers would also need updating.

### **Option 2- Remove slam shut valve from the bypass stream and restore with pipe spools (and NRV for [REDACTED])**

80. Option 2 involves removing the slamshut from the bypass stream and replacing with a non-return valve and pipe spools. This will remove the physical separation between the upstream and downstream pipework and allow a direct gas passage from the high-pressure system to the low-pressure system, which could over-pressurize the downstream pipework if the upstream supply pressure is higher than the normal operation pressure of



70 bar. As such, it is unlikely to be accepted without additional safety protection due to the potential operational safety risk.

### **Option 3- Air-gap the bypass stream with inlet and outlet isolation valves**

81. Option 3 involves removing the slamshut completely with an 'air-gap' in between a pair of isolation valves and blank flanges, physically separating the upstream and downstream systems. Subsequently, the bypass function would be lost until it was deemed necessary to be used for gas supply by operating the isolation valves.

### **Option 4- Replace slam shut valve with a paddle and isolation valve for maintenance purpose**

82. Option 4 involves removing the entire bypass stream from the existing system, including the slamshut and some portion of pipework followed by the capping of the inlet and outlet bypass pipework, resulting in a permanent elimination of the bypass line.

### **Option 5- Remove the entire bypass stream from the existing system**

83. Option 5 involves removing the slamshut and replacing it with a pair of isolation valves with a spectacle blind in-between. The addition of the isolation valves provides an intact separation of upstream and downstream pipework. However, it is uncertain whether the HSE would accept this solution as it involves manual procedural control which has an inherent risk of human error, and from a safety perspective, the spectacle blind would be operated behind only a single isolation.

### **Option 6- Remove remote control function of the slam shut valve, but keeping local manual control**

84. Option 6 involves disabling the remote-control function of the slamshut permanently but keeping the local manual control capability.

### **Option 7- Add a PRS stream in addition to the existing regulator system for a 2oo3 operation mode**

85. Option 7 involves installing a pressure reduction system (PRS) equipped with slam-shut, monitor and active control valves, creep relief and inlet and outlet isolation valves in parallel to the existing two volumetric-control regulator streams, maintaining any two streams to be normally operational for pressure and flow control. To minimize the risk of overpressure, a High Integrity Pressure Protection System could be introduced to shut down the streams from any high-pressure upstream pipework.

### **Option 8- Add an independent Pressure Reduction System (PRS) stream in addition to the existing regulator system**

86. Option 8 involves installing a complete PRS stream which is independent of the existing regulator streams to provide an additional gas supply route.
87. A variant of this option (Option 8b) is to install the PRS equipment onto the bypass line itself, making the bypass a fully regulated stream. This provides the maximum operational safety as the integrity of the stream has now been guaranteed with the protection provided by the PRS. It would also comply with IGEM/TD/13 as there is no alternative gas route bypassing the regulator streams.

### **Option 9- Adding inlet and outlet isolation valves with creep relief in-between to the bypass route on top of slam shut valve**

88. Option 9 involves adding inlet and outlet isolation valves with creep relief in-between to the bypass stream of the slamshut. The creep relief is equipped with inlet isolation valve to prevent gas venting when the bypass is in use.

### **Option 10- Add pressure interlock (+pressure transmitter) with feedback to slam shut valve**

89. Option 10 involves adding a pressure transmitter and interlock with feedback to the slamshut. This allows remote monitoring of the slamshut gas pressure by the operators for immediate reaction on events like over-pressurization.
90. For further details on the options presented above, the full option report has been included in Appendix 2.
91. Below is a summary table of all options considered at [REDACTED] assessed utilising the assessment criteria.

No.	Operation			Cost		Project Resources		HSE Compliance	Shortlist
	Flexibility after Modification	Complexity	Technical Feasibility	CAPEX	OPEX	Duration	Necessary Procedures and Equipment		
1a 1b	To be assessed	Very low	Uncertain - subject to network analysis	N/A	Low	N/A	Operational consideration required around procedures, no equipment needed.	TBC	Yes
2	Low due to lack of isolation valve between upstream and downstream system	Medium to High - removing large-diameter bare valve in vicinity of live gas pipework	Uncertain - different upstream and downstream pressures	Medium to High	Low	1-2 weeks	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cold cutting of concerned valve and removal of valve from site. New pipe spool to be welded to existing pipework and NDT and pressure test. Equipment needed include Pipe spools and NRV	Uncertain as it directly bypasses all the existing pressure regulators	No
3	Low due to physical separation between upstream and downstream gas system	Medium installing additional valves	TBC A considerable outage window would be necessary	Medium to High	N/A	1~2 weeks for modification. 2~3 days for restoring the bypass stream if needed.	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cut pipework. Tie-in new valves. NDT and pressure test. Equipment needed include Isolation valves (and Pipe spools at [REDACTED])	Acceptable	Yes
4	Low due to absence of bypass	Medium to High removing buried gas pipework from site and capping the bypass route	TBC A considerable outage window would be necessary. Confirmation needed that bypass would not be needed in future.	Medium to High	N/A	A few weeks	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cold cutting of concerned pipework and removal of pipework from site. Capping the remaining pipework. NDT and pressure test	Acceptable	No
5	Low due to physical separation between upstream and downstream gas system	Medium to High removing buried gas pipework from site and capping the bypass route	TBC A considerable outage window would be necessary	Medium to High	N/A	1-2 weeks	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cold cutting of concerned valve and removal of valve from site. Tie-in of new pipework and installation of spectacle blind. NDT and pressure test. Spectacle blind and valves needed	Likely. TBC	Yes

6	Medium, due to physical separation between upstream and downstream gas system Current V15 sea ing condition to be assessed	Very low	Adopted as the current operation mode for [REDACTED] station	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Unacceptable	No
7	High due to additional redundancy in option of failures of current regulator streams	Very high exposing the existing buried pipework, cutting, and modifying existing pipework to tie-in with the new stream	TBC a considerable outage window would be necessary	Very High	Additional OPEX for maintaining the new PRS stream	1~2 months including commissioning time	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cold cutting of concerned pipework and removing them from site. New pipework and regulators tie-in to existing pipework. NDT and pressure test T&C of the new regulator stream. Equipment required include SAM-shut valve, Monitor control valve, Active control valve, Creep relief valve, Inlet and outlet and isolation ball valves	Like y	Yes
8	High due to additional redundancy in option of failures of current regulator streams	Very high exposing the existing buried pipework, cutting, and modifying existing pipework to tie-in with the new stream	TBC a considerable outage window would be necessary	Very High Purchasing additional equipment and planning site manpower & resources	Additional OPEX for maintaining the new PRS stream	At [REDACTED]: 1~2 months including commissioning time At [REDACTED]: Around 1 week	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Cold cutting of concerned pipework and removing them from site. New pipework and regulators tie-in to existing pipework. NDT and pressure test T&C of the new regulator stream. Equipment needed include SAM-shut valve, Monitor control valve, Active control valve, Creep relief valve, Inlet and outlet and isolation ball valves	Like y	Yes
9	High enhancement of general operational safety of the entire system due to the new devices	High removing part of the existing pipework and tie-in of new devices with the bypass stream	TBC a considerable outage window would be necessary	High Purchasing additional equipment and planning site manpower & resources	Additional OPEX for maintaining the new safety devices/equipment	At [REDACTED]: Around 1 week At [REDACTED]: A few days	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework Cold cutting of concerned pipework and removing them from site New pipework and safety devices tie-in to existing pipework NDT and pressure test T&C of the new devices.	To be assessed depending on the type of safety devices added. Further review on IGEM/TD/13 would be necessary	No

10	TBA	Medium A tering the va ve contro and new cab ing work anticipated	TBC a considerab e outage window wou d be necessary	TBA	TBA	At [REDACTED]: A few days At [REDACTED]: TBA	TBC This wi invo ve excavations, stabbings, site ca cu ation	TBA	Yes
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Table 5 Options summary table at [REDACTED]

92. The qualitative assessment of each of the shortlisted options at [REDACTED] against the risk criteria is summarised in the table below:

Option No.	Operational risk	Maintenance Flexibility	Network Supply Security	Construction Complexity	Speed of Reinstatement
1a & 1b	Red	Green	Green	Green	N/A
3	Green	Yellow	Red	Yellow	Red
4 ([REDACTED] on y)	Green	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red
5	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow
7	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Red	N/A
8a	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Red	N/A
8b	Yellow	Green	Green	Red	N/A
9	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	N/A
10	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Green

Table 6 Shortlisted options summary table at [REDACTED]

### Options for ‘Scenario 2’- A bypass around the slamshut valve to a downstream asset such as compressor unit and boiler house

93. As discussed in section 5, there are [REDACTED] sites where uncontrolled bypasses are found around slamshut valves connected to a downstream asset.

94. To address this bypass concern, the existing bypass arrangements at both sites need to be modified to comply with the requirement of the applicable regulations. 4 common options were considered, they are:

#### Option 1- ‘Do Nothing’ Keep existing arrangement

95. Option 1 does not involve any modification done to the arrangement meaning we would be non-compliant with HSE action legal and bear the subsequent consequences.

#### Option 2- Install valve interlocks for valves bypassing the specified slamshut valves

96. Option 2 involves installing an interlock on the valve in the bypass stream to lock it in ‘closed’ position and interlocks on the valves in a series arrangement with the slamshut to lock them in ‘open’ positions such that both valves cannot be in open position simultaneously.

### **Option 3- Remove the entire bypass stream from the existing system**

97. Option 3 involves removing the slamshut and replacing it with a pair of isolation valves with a spectacle blind in-between. The addition of the isolation valves provides an intact separation of upstream and downstream pipework.

### **Option 4- Replace entire PRS systems with self-resetting slamshut**

98. Option 4 involves replacing the entire PRS systems equipped with a slamshut that would self-reset once the condition that triggered it had dissipated.



99. Below is a summary table of all options considered at the 15 sites in scenario 2:

No.	Operation			Cost		Project Resources	HSE Compliance	Shortlist
	Flexibility after Modification	Complexity	Technical Feasibility	CAPEX	OPEX	Necessary Procedures and Equipment		
1	No change, as per current maintenance procedure	Very low	Unlikely	None	None	No additional procedures apart from current practice	Unacceptable in terms of HSE procedure control and its non-compliance with TD/13	No
2	A physical separation of upstream and downstream system with only one valve operable at any one time	Very low	Feasible given the spacing and the size of the valves to be interlocked.	Medium	None	More on operational consideration rather than actual site work.	Enhancement of general operational safety of the entire system due to the new devices. Acceptable and satisfies HSE requirements	Yes
3	Low due to absence of bypass.	Medium due to removing existing bypass pipework from stream and capping the bypass route	Confirmation needed that bypass would not be needed in future.	Medium to High	None	Local gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework - removal of bypass lines and capping the remaining pipework. Reset of the bypass can be done using flexible hose to equalize the pressure either side.	Unacceptable in terms of HSE procedure control and non-compliance with IGEM/TD/13	No
4	High due to enhancement of general operational safety of the entire system due to the new devices	Very low	A considerable outage window would be necessary	Very High	Additional for maintaining the new PRS stream	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework Cold cutting of concerned pipework and removing them from site New pipework and safety devices tie-in to existing pipework NDT and pressure test T&C of the new devices	To be assessed depending on the type of safety devices added. Further review to ensure new system compliance with IGEM/TD/13 would be necessary	No

Table 7 Options summary table for scenario 2 sites

100. The qualitative assessment of each of the shortlisted options at the [redacted] sites in scenario 2 against the risk criteria is summarised in the table below:

Option No.	Operational risk	Maintenance Flexibility	Network Supply Security	Construction Complexity	Speed of Reinstatement
1	Red	Green	Green	Green	N/a
2	Green	Yellow	Green	Yellow	Yellow
3	Red	Red	Yellow	Yellow	Red
4	Green	Green	Green	Red	Green

Table 8 Shortlisted options summary table for scenario 2 sites

## Options for 'Scenario 3'- A bypass on incomer slamshut valve

101. [REDACTED] both have bypass pipeworks around their incomer valves.
102. To address this bypass concern, the existing bypass arrangements at both sites need to be modified to comply with the requirement of the applicable regulations. 6 common options were considered, they are:

### Option 1- 'Do Nothing' Keep existing arrangement

103. Option 1 does not involve any modification done to the arrangement- a bypass locally locked shut and isolated- meaning we would be non-compliant with HSE action legal and bear the subsequent consequences.

### Option 2- Blank off rider pipework above ground

104. Option 2 involves removing the bypass pipework - spool and isolation valves on the rider pipework ends- and installing blank flanges.

### Option 3- Blank off rider pipework below ground

105. Option 3 involves removing the bypass pipework and valves and cap the remaining pipework underground, requiring excavation to access the pipework to blank off.

### Option 4- Simple pipe spool bypass

106. Option 4 is similar to option 1- do-nothing- but without any controls.

### Option 5- Bypass with spectacle blind

107. Option 5 involves retaining the bypass and replacing the throttling valve on the bypass spool with a spectacle blind for maintenance purposes.

### Option 6- Bypass with slamshut arrangement

108. Option 6 involves adding a slamshut system to the bypass spool to provide increased safety and control.
109. For further details on the options presented, the full option report has been included in Appendix 3.

No.	Operation			Cost		Project Resources		HSE Compliance	Shortlist
	Flexibility after Modification	Complexity	Technical Feasibility	CAPEX	OPEX	Duration	Necessary Procedures and Equipment		
1	No change Bypass can be utilised if/when necessary	N/A	Current operation	N/A	No change	N/A	Operational considerations rather than site work. No equipment required.	Deemed unacceptable as human error / misunderstanding may lead to operation of the bypass valves	No
2	LOW The bypass cannot be reinstated easily.	Low	Medium. Outage required to remove the valves and install blank flanges. Leaves pipework accessible for future use.	Low (Excludes impact of outage)	No change	~1 week	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Removal of valves. Installation of blank flanges. Pressure test. Blank flanges required.	Acceptable as no valve available to operate to install bypass hose.	Yes
3	Low. Due to absence of bypass.	High	Low Due to absence of bypass	Medium to high. Site manpower and resources to be planned.	No change	A few weeks	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework Excavating around key assets. Cutting of pipework and removing the pipework from site. Capping the remaining pipework. NDT and pressure test. Blank flanges Pipe cutting tools Excavation equipment	Acceptable as the process safety is improved without the presence of bypass	No
4	No change. Bypass can be utilised if/when necessary	N/A	Current operation	N/A	No change	N/A	Operational considerations rather than site work. No Equipment required	Deemed unacceptable as human error / misunderstanding may lead to operation of the bypass valves	No
5	Medium to high. Physical separation between upstream and downstream pipework for maintenance and flexibility to restore the bypass with the throttling valve again.	Medium	High. A considerable outage window would be necessary	Medium to high. Cost of spectacle blind, spool and installation. Site manpower and resources to be planned.	Low. Minimal maintenance on spectacle blind.	1~2 weeks	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. De-fanging the concerned valve from the bypass pipework (cutting excessive piping from bypass if necessary). Tie-in of pup piece and installation of spectacle blind. NDT and pressure test. Spectacle blind and pup piece required	Possible. A physical separation of upstream and downstream system with low risk of gas leakage. Spectacle blind can still be operated in error.	No

6	High. Presence of additional stream for flexibility in maintenance.	High	Medium. A considerable outage window would be necessary. Technically superior solution which has been adopted in other installations.	High. Cost of spools, safety shut-off and control system. Site manpower and resources to be planned.	Medium. Some maintenance necessary on safety shut-off system.	1 month	Gas isolation and depressurisation of related pipework. Tie-in of new SSV system and related tubing connection. Installation of pressure gauge downstream of the SSV system in accordance with IGEM/TD/13. NDT and pressure test of new pipework. Commissioning of new SSV system. SSV pipework and tubing connection required.	Acceptable. Additional security of safety shut-off prevents inadvertent gas bypass around safety valve. Compliant with IGEM/TD/13.	Yes
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Table 9 Options Summary Table at [REDACTED]

# 7. Business Case Outline and Discussion

## Key Business Case Drivers

### Health and Safety Legislation

110. Health and Safety is the primary driver for this project. Legislation including the Health and Safety at Work Act, PSSR and COMAH (only applicable to [REDACTED]) are all pertinent to the HSE Action Legal actions which arose during an incident investigation.
111. The Pressure Systems Safety Regulations 2000 (PSSR) cover the safe design and use of pressure systems. The aim of PSSR is to prevent serious injury from the hazard of stored energy (pressure) as a result of the failure of a pressure system or one of its component parts.
112. This project aims to address the findings and subsequent Action Legal by reducing the risk to ALARP.

### Financial

113. In addition to any legal enforcement notices with associated uncapped financial penalties, any interruption to the flow of gas at the site would be highly detrimental to the NTS with far reaching consequences in the UK and Europe, leading to consumer impact.
114. Improving the overpressure protection system also reduces the potential for any overpressure events occurring on downstream pipework which could lead to undue stress on pipelines, resulting in accelerated deterioration and increased prevalence of leaks.

## Business Case Summary

115. The need to address legislative findings by developing and agreeing an action plan with the HSE based on the recommendations of studies resulted in the progression of our preferred option.
116. Ultimately, if the work is not completed, the risk will remain and there will be the potential for an Improvement (or possible Prohibition) notice with uncapped financial penalties which would far outweigh the costs of the project.

## 8. Preferred Option Scope and Project Plan

### Options Summary and Preferred Options

#### Scenario 1- Double-stream flow regulating system with an uncontrolled bypass stream

117. After reviewing the ten potential options proposed by [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], all options bar 8 and 10 were eliminated for the following reasons:
- Option 2 – Installation of a non-return valve to replace the valve on the bypass- this option does not provide any overpressure protection.
  - Option 6 – Carry out no modifications and retain manual control of the bypass- this option is not acceptable to the HSE.
  - Option 4 - removal of the bypass stream - was eliminated quickly for [REDACTED] due to the criticality of the supply to [REDACTED]. Further discussions with the System Operator on this option concluded that the removal of the bypass at [REDACTED] was not viable due to the need to retain to avoid a constraint on [REDACTED] when flowing South to North impacting exit pressures at [REDACTED].
  - Option 1 – Do nothing. The current installation is not acceptable to the HSE.
  - Option 3 – Remove the bypass valve leaving an air gap that a pipe spool could be inserted if there was a need to operate the bypass- This would not have provided any overpressure protection and the time taken to install the spool would be too long to avoid operational difficulties and potential loss of supply.
  - Option 5 – Replacing the bypass valve with a spectacle blind- This was eliminated for the same reasons as Option 3.
  - Option 7 – Installing a PRS adjacent to the existing regulating streams, but retaining the bypass- This option was eliminated, as it did not address the bypass issue itself.
  - Option 9 – Installation of isolation valves with a creep relief- This option only increased the integrity of the isolation, but does not itself provide overpressure protection
118. Option 10 was the lowest cost option and could be delivered earliest to meet the requirements of the HSE. However, after being subjected to a Hazard & Operability (HAZOP) Study, further discussions prior to performing a Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) to establish the integrity requirements of the safety instrumented system identified that this option would not achieve the integrity target required to prevent the potential consequences of the overpressure scenario.





Option	Description	Project Start Date	Project Finish Date	Total Cost (18/19 £m)	Cost Accuracy
3	Remove the entire bypass stream from the existing system	April 2023	February 2024	██████	5%

Table 12 Final option summary and high-level project plan at ██████████

### Scenario 3- A bypass around slamshut incomer valves

122. After reviewing the potential six options proposed by ██████████, all options bar 2 and 6 were eliminated for the following reasons:

- Options 1 and 4 would not meet the safety requirements and HSE would not be satisfied, therefore not shortlisted.
- Option 3 would require excavation to access the pipework to blank off so was not shortlisted as option 2 does the same, therefore not shortlisted.
- Option 5 would involve removing the blanking plates by breaking containment and this would incur added risk in the associated works, therefore not shortlisted.
- Option 6 involves installing a new slamshut on the bypass which is more costly than option 2. As the bypasses were installed purely for equalising the pressure across the incomer valves to allow them to be reset if they had closed. NGT is confident pressure equalisation across the valves can be achieved by using existing process pipework hence negates the need to use a bypass.

123. As a result, option 2- Blank-off rider pipework above ground; Remove the bypass spool and isolation valves on the rider pipework ends and install blank flanges- was selected as the final option at those sites.

Option	Description	Project Start Date	Project Finish Date	Total Cost (18/19 £m)	Cost Accuracy
2	Blank - off rider pipework above ground; Remove the bypass spool and isolation valves on the rider pipework ends and install blank flanges	January 2024	May 2024	██████	5%

Table 13 Final option summary and high-level project plan at ██████████

## Project Spend Profile

124. The table below shows the project spend profile for our preferred option in 18/19 prices:

Sites	FY22 (£)	FY23 (£)	FY24 (£)	FY25 (£)	FY26 (£)	Total Cost (£)
Total Cost (£)						3,301,605

Table 14 Project Spend Profile

## Key Business Risks & Opportunities

- 125. Our commitment to the HSE to complete by the original Action Legal deadline of December 2023 has required us to progress the project prior to receiving a determination from Ofgem. This proactive approach has ensured we should achieve success on time but has involved capital expenditure in advance of this funding request.
- 126. Outage availability/duration and operational resource to deliver the solutions across the multiple sites without impacting our network operation are the main constraints faced by the project.

127. As this technology has never been implemented on our operational sites within NGT before, the complexity of such a technical challenge requires a longer period of time for NGT to consider potential options at the sites, select a preferred options thoroughly and delivery of the solution on site.

## Outputs and Allowances in RIIO-T2

128. There were no outputs relating to enhancements to over pressure protection systems NTS AGIs in RIIO-T2. Costs have been incurred from this project during the RIIO-T2 regulatory period only.

### Additional RIIO-2 Outputs

129. Costs associated with the preferred option for the project have been assigned against the RIIO-2 Unique Identifiers in the table below:

UID	Baseline volume of Intervention (By PP)	Baseline total funding available (18/19)	Baseline total funding available (18/19)	ECC unit cost (18/19)	Current volume of intervention	ECC total funding required (18/19)	Output Year	UID funding requested through UM
	(by unit of measure)				(by unit of measure)	(£)		




Table 15 RIIO-2 Outputs

### NARMs Benefit

130. Following discussions with Ofgem in the NARM Development Monthly Meetings, the initial view, while not finalised, is that any work proposed against pre-existing RIIO-T2 baseline funded UIDs in the NARMs A1 category will lead to a restatement of the target (as of SpC 3.1, Part C). Any new UIDs created for investment will automatically fall into the NARMs categories A2/A3 and could result in an update of the Asset Health Non-lead assets PCD Annex (as per SpC 3.14.4).

131. It is proposed that all the investments arising from the re-openers shall result in one update to the Network Asset Risk Workbook (NARW) following the process described in Special Condition 3.1, Part C: Rebasing of Baseline Network Risk Outputs. This is to be

conducted following Ofgem's licence direction following the January 2023 Asset health Reopener determination.

## 9. Conclusion

- 132. This report has explained the needs case, options considered and the programmatic aspects of the project.
- 133. The project has used the outputs from HSE inspections and independent studies to develop a series of designs and associated scope of works to optimally meet a range of operational requirements and specifications.
- 134. The works at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## 10. Appendices

- Appendix 1 - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- Appendix 2 - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- Appendix 3 - [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]