NTS Entry Capacity Reserve Price Discounts – Discussion Paper GCD04

5th April 2007 Gas TCMF



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Recap

- Issue identified in G TCMF in May 2006 and included in Progress Report (October 2006)
- March 2007 High level data summary and Pros and Cons.....
 - Assist price discovery for short term auctions; ensures price does not inhibit clearance allocation
 - Under-recovery of TO revenue from auctions; diluted cost reflectivity; weakened investment signals; increased risk of constraints high/volatile short term prices; inhibit secondary capacity trading at unconstrained ASEPs, likelihood of interruption not reflected in price



Update

- Auction data from July 2006 to February 2007
- Comparison of capacity sold with actual energy flowed
- Auction type % sales and % revenue

Definition for this update:-

"Daily" capacity = firm day ahead + firm within day "Monthly" capacity = AMSEC + RMSEC




July06-Feb07 Baseline clearance, % DSEC

	Max. Baseline Sold	Firm Daily auction
	(%)	(Average %)
Bacton	100	30
Barrow	100	31
Easington (inc Rough)	100	10
St Fergus	100	15
Teesside	100	69
Theddlethorpe	100	62


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Entry Capacity Auction Data - Format







Bacton capacity sales update




Barrow capacity sales update




Easington & Rough capacity sales update




St Fergus capacity sales update




Teesside capacity sales update




Theddlethorpe capacity sales update



Capacity energy sale (%) by Auction Type



Capacity revenue (%) by Auction Type





Summary of Observations from auctions

- Baseline clearance has occurred
- Daily capacity allocation 10-70% of total
- Daily capacity revenue 0-30% of total
- Flow max. less than baseline (except Easington)
- Revenue under-recovery has lead to high TO commodity charge



Options: Entry Capacity Baseline Reserve Price Discount

	Option 1	Option 2	Option 3	Option 4 (As Current)
LTSEC (Firm)	0%	0%	0%	0%
AMSEC (Firm)	0%	0%	0%	0%
RMSEC (Firm)	0%	0%	0%	0%
DSEC Day Ahead (Firm)	0%	33.3% conditional	33.3% conditional	33.3%
DSEC Within Day (Firm)	0%	100% conditional	100% conditional	100%
DISEC (Interruptible)	100%	100%	100% conditional	100%

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Conditional reserve price discounts

- Option 2 discounts only apply to firm DSEC if all or a significant proportion of capacity available in Quarterly and Monthly auctions is sold
- Option 3 discounts only apply to interruptible if all or a significant proportion of firm capacity available is sold (i.e. product may otherwise effectively be firm) + option 2 for firm DSEC

Discussion questions

- Use of discounts for day ahead and within day firm capacity?
- Conditional use of discounts?
 - "Firm" condition after AMSEC or after RMSEC?
 - "Interruptible" condition, no/limited firm available?
- Capacity trading at ASEPs currently inhibited?
- Necessity / problems arising from zero priced within day firm capacity?
- Linkage of discounts to under-recovery and thence smeared costs?

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Next step

 Publish and consult on Pricing Discussion paper (28 day consultation).

